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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper argues that for purposes of managing transboundary
environment problems in general, and marine ecosystems in particular,
the role of international law as traditionally understood is somewhat
overrated. 1 Binding international legal obligations owed by states to
* Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota.
1. Some recent legal scholarship expands the definition of what counts as
international law. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2002) (stating that "soft law should be considered

other states often turn out to be a good deal less important in environmental
problem solving than is commonly supposed by many international
lawyers, legal scholars, and environmental NGOs (non-governmental
organizations). Specifically, this paper argues that emphasis on binding
multilateral environmental agreements among sovereign states is often
misplaced and possibly even counterproductive, insofar as it threatens to
divert attention from more promising strategies for managing important
categories of transboundary environmental problems. These strategies
typically involve novel multi-party regional collaborative governance
arrangements that include sub-national and non-state actors as well as
sovereign states. Such strategies seek integrated and adaptive management
at ecosystem scales. This open-ended, experimentalist problem-solving
approach calls into question the primacy of fixed rules of obligation
owed by states to other states.
This argument is not grounded in the usual Neo-realist objections to
the role of international law. Neo-realists argue that international law
operates mainly as a rhetorical smokescreen that imposes little real
constraint on the self-interested actions of coldly rational, calculating,
power-maximizing sovereign states.2 Numerous commentators have
pointed out that the Neo-realist view is difficult to square with the level
of genuine cooperation that now exists in the intemational environmental
arena, 3 but such longstanding debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
Building on the recent work of Eyal Benvenisti,4 I argue that
international legal agreements among states-and more specifically,
multilateral agreements consisting of fixed, binding, rules of obligation
owed by states to other states-are a suboptimal instrument for addressing
some important categories of transnational environmental problems.
This is so for several reasons.
II. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

As any student of collective action readily grasps, public international
law is limited in its scope and effectiveness by deep structural
infirmities. In general, the bedrock principle of state sovereignty and the
corollary rule of consent make it exceedingly difficult to get sovereign
international law"); Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, The Changing Nile Basin
Regime: Does Law Matter?, 43 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 105 (2002).

2. See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1836-37 (summarizing Realist and Neo-realist
arguments); Stephen D. Krasner, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations: Together,
Apart, Together?, I CHI. J. 1NT'L L. 93, 94-95 (2000).
3. Cf Guzman (stating that the Neo-realist view is difficult to reconcile with the
level of effort that states seem to invest in international agreements generally).
4. See EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE (2002).
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states to agree to be bound by international legal rules and norms unless
they see a clear self-interest in doing so. Given the "public good"
character of international environmental progress, the temptation for any
nation to free-ride is very strong. Moreover, even if states do manage to
reach agreement, nominally binding rules may fall victim to free-riding
for the second time at the implementation stage, in the form of undercompliance. Exacerbating this problem, sanctions for non-compliance are
typically quite limited in scope and effectiveness-and not merely by
accident or inattention, but by design, because sovereign states are reluctant
to agree to be bound by stronger measures. 5 In addition, given the diffuse
and collective nature of the benefits that flow from environmental
cooperation, rarely would any state have adequate incentives to hold
itself out as enforcer of the terms of a multilateral environmental agreement,
even if dispute resolution mechanisms and meaningful sanctions were
available.
At first blush, these considerations might appear to militate against
any kind of meaningful international environmental cooperation. Note,
however, that the scope of these claims is actually somewhat narrower.
These arguments are rooted in an analysis of the interests of states qua
states and go mainly to the limitations of a particular kind of transnational
environmental cooperation. That is, cooperation in the nature of mutually
agreed, reciprocal, legally binding, enforceable obligations among
sovereign states-in sum, what we usually think of as international law.
But transnational environmental cooperation need not be confined to
this sort of familiar state-centric legal arrangement. Transnational
environmental cooperation is not only possible but is in fact occurring,
albeit not exclusively or even primarily through the vehicle of intersovereign legal agreements. To be sure, sovereign states still matter and
will continue to play a major role in transnational environmental politics
and governance for the foreseeable future. But because their incentives
and capacities are often poorly matched to the nature and scope of the
environmental challenges to be addressed, sovereign states are in crucial
respects suboptimal parties, individually and collectively, to whom we
entrust the task of solving complex transnational environmental problems.
This reflects the limitation of international law in this regard, in its nearexclusive focus on sovereign states and inter-sovereign obligations to

5. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).

address problems that might better be addressed through other kinds of
governance arrangements.
III. SCALE MISMATCHES

Obviously, some environmental problems cannot be resolved within
the territorial boundaries of sovereign states because the geographical
scope of the problem extends beyond state boundaries. But international
law is not the only instrument available to address these sorts of
transnational problems; nor are global multilateral treaties the only
alternative to state-by-state decision making.
In both academic and popular discourse, international environmental
challenges are habitually described as problems of the "global commons,"
but that well-worn metaphor is often misleading. A small handful of
environmental problems--ozone depletion and global climate change
being leading examples-are genuinely global in character, both in the
sense that the problem exists indivisibly on a global scale and because
requisite solutions ultimately must operate on a global scale lest externalities
generated in some locations undermine progress elsewhere. But these
sorts of truly "global-global" problems-problems that occur globally
and indivisibly and therefore require global-scale solutions-are in fact
the exception, rather than the paradigmatic case they are often assumed
to be. More commonly, environmental problems are ubiquitous, in some
cases even globally distributed, but are nonetheless divisible into smaller
subsets that do lend themselves to sub-global solutions at the regional,
national, or local level. For these problems, environmental progress can
be made in particular localities, nations, or regions without serious threat
that lack of cooperation from other quarters will undercut the effectiveness
of those efforts. One example of such a globally distributed but locally
soluble problem is the loss and degradation of wetlands, addressed
internationally
6 though the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance. Wetland loss is occurring all over the planet; the problem
is globally distributed. But the failure of some nations to address the
problem does not seriously impinge upon the ability of others to do
better, and to that extent global solutions are not essential. If a country
like Sweden or the United States, or a region like Western Europe or
North America, undertakes to protect its wetlands, it can proceed unilaterally
or on a regional basis without fear that less vigorous efforts in other
parts of the world will somehow undercut whatever environmental gains

6. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially As
Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245.
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might result from sound wetlands management where it is practiced.'
To characterize the wetlands problem as a "global commons" problem
just because it is global in distribution, or because some of the benefits
of wetlands have a transnational "public good" character, is therefore
highly misleading. It suggests wrongly that progress is impossible anywhere
unless all parties cooperate. Similar arguments can be made with respect
to protection of other habitat or ecosystem types, including marine and
coastal ecosystems, as I shall argue shortly.
Many other important categories of environmental problems are genuinely
transnational, in the sense that solutions do require cooperation across
the boundaries of two or more neighboring states. But a good many of
these are regional rather than global in character. 8 One example is the
management of international watercourses. Sound management of the
Danube, for instance, does not in any meaningful way depend upon the
level of cooperation achieved in managing the Mekong, or vice-versa.
Another example is acid deposition ("acid rain"), which typically occurs
over continental rather than global scales. In these cases, solutions may
require cooperation among all states within the relevant watershed or
airshed, but watersheds or airsheds could in principle be managed
effectively even in the absence of global rules. Of course, there is nothing
wrong with global cooperation in these areas if it can be achieved, but
given the difficulties inherent in negotiating strong global inter-sovereign
agreements, one must question the enormous effort that goes into
negotiating global rules concerning what are essentially regional problems.
Any set of global rules for managing international watercourses, for
example, will almost inevitably prove incomplete and inadequate to the
task of actually managing any particular watershed in an environmentally
sound way. Under such circumstances, the rules set down by a global
multilateral agreement will operate at best as a set of imprecise and
incomplete defaults around which parties will bargain to more specific,
7. To be sure, because many wetlands serve as habitat for migratory bird species,
loss of wetlands in one state or region might impose some negative environmental
externalities on other states, making transnational cooperation desirable. But even those
sorts of spillover effects are typically confined to particular regional "flyways." Many of
the environmental benefits associated with wetlands, such as flood control, water
filtration, groundwater recharge, and provision of habitat for local assemblages of plant
and animal life, can be had through sound local management even if other wetlands are
badly managed.
8. I use the term "regional" somewhat loosely here to refer to any problem that is
transnational but less than global in geographic scope, ranging from two or more
geographically contiguous states.

regionally tailored solutions. Viewed in that light, global rules might
prove marginally helpful as a set of background conditions influencing
the bargaining positions of the parties, but in themselves are neither
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the kind of transnational cooperation
needed to achieve ecologically sound watercourse management.
Somewhat more provocatively perhaps, I contend that even the
oceans-typically viewed as the quintessential "global commons"--should
be reconceptualized as a complex set of (admittedly interrelated) regional
problems, requiring an equally complex set of regional solutions. It is a
familiar temptation to think of the oceans as a single, vast, and
indivisible global ecosystem. Yet contemporary science tells us that the
oceans are far from an undifferentiated whole. Even though their parts
are deeply interrelated, the oceans are more accurately seen as a rich
mosaic of interdependent and overlapping local and regional biotic
communities, habitats, and geochemical-physical processes, arrayed in
distinctive bio-regional patterns-a web of distinctive ecosystems. 9
Some of these ecosystems face familiar threats from land-based pollution,
overfishing, and destruction of wetlands, mangrove forests, and other
critical coastal and nearshore habitats. Notice, however, that many of
these problems tend to be concentrated in nearshore waters and coastal
regions, that is, primarily within the territorial seas and Exclusive
Economic Zones of coastal states, within their internal waters (such as
bays and estuaries), on coastal lands, and in interior watersheds that
affect conditions in estuaries and nearshore waters.
Like the problem of wetlands loss, ecologically sound management of
these nearshore marine and coastal ecosystems does not necessarily
require global solutions. In principle at least, progress in managing many of
these ecosystems could be made within particular localities, within
nations, or within transboundary regions, even if all states cannot agree
to cooperate in that effort. To be sure, the interconnectedness of marine
ecosystems means that poor management of some nearshore and coastal
areas will produce environmental externalities elsewhere; and to that
extent, as with the wetlands example, transnational cooperation may
ultimately be desirable. It would be a serious mistake, though, to think
of the oceans as a purely "global" problem, requiring purely global
solutions. As with wetlands and watercourses, universally-agreed global
rules are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for improved
marine ecosystem management. Importapt environmental gains can be
9. See Richard L. Hill, Biologist Advocates New Rules for Ocean, THE OREGONIAN,
Feb. 16, 2003, at A 19 (reporting findings of an interdisciplinary team of marine
scientists who say the oceans are "not just one big neighborhood, but are chopped up into
smaller ones" which can be managed at smaller scales "on a neighborhood-byneighborhood basis").
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had at regional, national, and local scales, even if efforts lag in other
places.
In cases where the affected regional ecosystem extends beyond the
boundaries of a single state, some kind of transnational cooperation
obviously will be necessary. But another kind of geographical mismatch
comes immediately into play. For in addition to crossing state boundaries,
coastal and marine ecosystems tend to divide states internally. A
troubled regional marine ecosystem-such as the Gulf of Maine, shared by
several U.S. New England states and Canadian Atlantic provinces-might
profoundly affect coastal regions of several neighboring nations, for
example, but be of little concern to people in the interior or along some
other distant shore of any of those states. To be sure, some activities in
the interior-particularly pollution, habitat loss, and hydrological
alterations in the watersheds of tributary rivers-can have significant
downstream effects on coastal and marine ecosystems, so that to improve
conditions in the marine area we might also need to co-manage parts of
the interior. But very often, coastal communities in neighboring states
will have stronger common interests in how a regional marine ecosystem
is managed than do the coastal and interior regions of a single state.
Scale mismatches of this nature often leave states with relatively weak
incentives to address transnational (or for that matter "national") marine
environmental problems, which may be internally divisive or viewed as
problems of a merely "regional" rather than truly "national" concern.
More generally, states qua states often have relatively weak incentives
to engage in environmental protection, faced as they are with competing
or conflicting domestic political imperatives and priorities, as well as
competing diplomatic goals. Leaving the management of transnational
environmental problems entirely to sovereign states, then, especially
under a rule that requires unanimity and consent among all states before
action is taken, looks like a recipe for inaction or for weak, leastcommon-denominator approaches. A more promising strategy might be
to "build from the ground up" by more directly involving the parties that
have the most tangible stake in the outcome, i.e., directly affected
communities, industries, and interest groups.l° States, of course, will almost
certainly enter this picture at some point, and they possess resources and
unique capabilities that allow them to play a prominent role.
10. See id. (reporting marine scientists' conclusion that management at local scales
encourages emphasis on local benefits and builds local community support for marine
environmental protection).

In sum, a strategy that relies exclusively or excessively on states to
address transboundary environmental problems is likely to find a tough
going. Strategies that involve other actors whose interests are better
matched to the scale and nature of the resource and with greater
incentives to initiate and sustain action have a better chance of success.
IV. CAPACITY MISMATCHES: FROM REGULATION BY FIXED RULE TO
ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

Growing recognition of the complexity, pervasiveness, and mutual
interdependence of environmental problems is prompting a rethinking of
environmental regulation and natural resource management strategies,
both within the nation state and at the international level. Recent years
have seen a marked shift from a regulatory model based on top-down,
piecemeal, command-style fixed rules, towards a model based on locally
or regionally tailored, broadly integrative, collaborative, experimental,
and adaptive polyarchic governance arrangements that seek to manage
entire ecosystems. 1
The characteristic model of environmental regulation that emerged
from the 1960s onward was rule-based and rule-bound. 12 It sought to
solve environmental problems by imposing and enforcing fixed uniform
rules, understood as binding commands by the sovereign state to which
all subject to its jurisdiction must conform. This approach implicitly
assumes that an expert decision-maker-the regulatory agency (an arm
of the state)--would identify the most important environmental problems,
gather sufficient expert information to specify effective solutions,
express those solution as a series of specific legally binding commands,
and finally enforce those commands by employing the coercive sanctioning
power of the state. Characteristically, this model approaches complex
problems by fragmentation, attempting to carve the larger ecological
puzzle into smaller pieces that can be isolated and managed through
categorical, command-style rules.
This conventional rule-making approach tends to focus regulatory
effort on those aspects of environmental protection most susceptible to
control by piecemeal categorical rules. 13 It typically emphasizes pollution
11.

See Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic

Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel et al., Beyond
Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000).

12. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law" Litigation,
17 PACE. ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering
in the Age of Collaboration,2002 Wis. L. REv. 555 (2002).
13.
MARY GRAHAM,ThE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENviRONMENTAL
POLITICS (1999).
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outputs over ecological conditions, pollution control over pollution
prevention, large sources over small ones, and medium-by-medium and
pollutant-by-pollutant rules over integrated approaches.14 It tends to rely
on fixed, highly prescriptive rules rather than flexible standards or
adjustable goals and objectives. These characteristics of environmental
regulation are popularly captured in the term "command-and-control."
The limitations of this approach have been the subject of much
commentary. Despite significant reductions in pollution from the largest
sources, diffuse sources remain largely uncontrolled.' 5 Uncoordinated
piecemeal regulatory programs impose redundant costs on both
administrators and regulated entities, while critical problems fall
between the cracks. 6 Rules crafted under necessarily fragmentary and
incomplete information tend to be inflexible, either underinclusive or
overinclusive, and costly to promulgate and implement. Sometimes
rules work at cross purposes with other rules. 7 Most importantly, even
as progress is made on some narrowly defined problems, ecosystems
continue to be fragmented and degraded. 8
Recently, however, a new regulatory model has begun to emerge, one
that aims at integrated management of watersheds, estuaries, enclosed
or semi-enclosed seas, old-growth forests, and other critically threatened
ecosystems. Ecosystems exhibit unique local characteristics and therefore
require context-sensitive management. Scientists and leading policymakers have also come to appreciate that ecosystems are complex, dynamic
systems composed of numerous mutually interdependent components
and processes. These processes are often poorly understood due to gaps
in basic scientific understanding, non-linear threshold effects, and high
degrees of inherent stochasticity. 9 In the words of one leading ecologist,

14. Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging
Models of EnvironmentalProtection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 61 (2000) [hereinafter Farber,
Reinvention]; Richard B. Stewart, A New Generationof Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U. L. REv. 21 (2001).
15. U.S. EPA, Edgewater Consensus (1994).
16. Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy:
Government-Business Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10891, 10895 (2001). Stewart, supra note 14.
17. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27

Loy. L. A. L. REv. 791, 793-94 (1994) [hereinafter Farber, Learning].
18. U.S. EPA, Edgewater Consensus, supra note 15.
19.

Lance H. Gunderson, Stepping Back: Assessingfor Understandingin Complex

Regional Ecosystems, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENTS: SCIENCE AT THE CROSSROADS OF

MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (K. Norman Johnson et al. eds., 1999).

"Ecosystems turn out to be not only more complex than we think-they
are more complex than we can think.",20 Given the complex
interdependencies of ecosystem components and processes, they must be
managed as systems, employing an integrated, holistic, "place-based,"
ecosystem-specific management approach. 21 In place of programdelimited rules, then, a high degree of inter-program and interagency
policy coordination is required; and in place of uniform regulatory
requirements, context-sensitive locally tailored solutions are preferred.
Complexity in ecosystem processes also demands that managers
eschew reliance on fixed rules. Advocates of an ecosystem-oriented
approach urge the adoption of flexible and adaptive policy-making
approaches based on principles of continuous experimentation and dynamic
adjustment in response to advancements in scientific understanding, new
and continuously improving information, changing conditions, and the
observed effects of past management efforts. Within this framework,
every policy decision is understood as necessarily provisional. In short,
an experimentalist "rolling rule" approach is emerging as the dominant
paradigm in ecosystem management.23 These technical features of the
new model of environmental regulation are captured in the term
"adaptive management," which has gained widespread currency in the
scientific community and among the policy-makers most attuned to an
24
ecosystems-oriented approach to environmental management.
This new regulatory model has far-reaching institutional implications.
If ecosystems are to be managed effectively, governance structures must
be matched to the eco-geographical scale of the resource to be managed.
That scale typically does not map well onto conventional, territoriallydelimited political and jurisdictional boundaries. 25 In some cases, the
nation-state will map across numerous and diverse ecological systems
20. REED F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT
CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1997).
21. Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society ofAmerica
Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6(3) ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 665 (1996); C. S. Holling et al., Science, Sustainability and Resource
Management, in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDNG RESILIENCE 342 (Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke
eds., 1998); Gunderson, supra note 19; U.S. Forest Service Committee of Scientists,
Sustaining the People's Lands: Recommendations for Stewardship of Forests and
Grasslands into the Next Century (1999).
22. Christensen et al., supra note 21, at 669-71.
23. Doff & Sabel, supra note 11; Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard
Environmentalism: Toward a Performance-BasedRegime of Environmental Regulation,
44 AMER. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 692 (2000).
24.
KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); Gunderson, supra note 19, at 35-36.

25. Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 893 (1994).
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and must be subdivided into smaller functional units. In other cases, the
ecological system will straddle territorial boundaries, making transboundary
cooperation imperative. Standard territorially delimited subnational
units of government-states, counties, and municipalities in the U.S.
context-are also typically a poor fit, either too large or too small, or both
simultaneously. At a minimum, then, a high degree of intergovernmental
coordination is typically required to manage ecosystems at the appropriate
eco-geographical scale.
Beyond intergovernmentalism, however, ecosystem management
demands a deeper reconfiguration of governance structures. Ecosystem
management requires integrated management of the multiple resources
and stressors that jointly comprise the ecological whole. Yet the
conventional regulatory structures of the nation-state are poorly matched
to the scope of this management task. Competencies are typically
fragmented among multiple, mission-specific governmental agencies
and (especially in federal systems like the United States) further
dispersed over multiple tiers of government-federal, state, and local.26
Other crucial and scarce resources-land, economic decision-making
power, knowledge, and expertise-are largely in the hands of private
(non-state) actors, including landowners, businesses, the scientific
community, and not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
In principle, of course, the state as sovereign could command or entice
any of these non-state actors to conform to a state-devised and statedirected plan to protect the ecological resource. Yet the complex and
dynamic nature of ecosystems, coupled with the corollary need to
maintain a flexible, dynamic, continuous-learning approach, place it
beyond the capacity of any state agency or the state as a whole to
develop such a plan ex ante.
In response to this crisis of state competence, the state has little choice
but to enlist the aid of non-state actors-including intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), NGOs, the business community, landowners, and
the independent scientific community-and draw on their expertise and
resources, as well as their commitment to use the competencies at their
disposal to join in an open-ended effort at collaborative problem-solving.
These arrangements place state actors side-by-side with non-state actors
in a joint enterprise to define and assess the ecological problem to be
addressed, propose and evaluate provisional solutions, determine and
26.

Holling et al., supra note 21.

execute management plans, monitor outcomes, and assess and revise
joint plans as necessary throughout the management effort. Thus
expertise, resources, and capacities are pooled in hybrid public/private
problem-solving governance arrangements.2 7 Nor can that joint effort
simply be a once-off advisory exercise, in which non-state parties advise
the state as it devises a rule that then becomes final and binding on all
the state's subjects through a conventional exercise of state sovereignty.
As we have seen, continuous learning, experimentation, and "adaptive
management" remain essential elements of the enterprise, in which nonstate parties operate as partners with sovereign states. What emerges,
then, is co-governance of the ecosystem by the state and its various nonstate partners whose participation may be as critical to the project's
ultimate success as is the participation of the state itself.28 In the process,
conventional distinctions between state and non-state, sovereign and
subject, and command and compliance become blurred.
The emphasis in these problem-solving institutional collaborations is
neither on imposing rules that constrain the exercise of sovereignty from
above nor on achieving inter-sovereign horizontal diffusion of successful
approaches. Instead, the new governance arrangements amount to an
informal and largely tacit amendment to conventional understandings of
the nature of sovereign authority. 29 Although states remain leading
actors in these collaborative problem-solving arrangements, authority to
address problems traditionally considered to fall within the province of
state sovereignty is reassigned to hybrid constellations of state and nonstate actors. The effective locus of governance thus devolves from the
sovereignty of the state to dynamic and continuously evolving polyarchic
arrangements. I call this phenomenon "post-sovereign" governance.
Of course, non-state actors have long been involved in conventional
law and policy-making processes in consultative, advisory, or "lobbying"
capacities. In the new governance arrangements, however, the role of
non-state actors is more than merely that of consultant, advisor, or
lobbyist to a sovereign authority that retains ultimate discretion to define
policy and to issue binding law. Instead, decision-making-governance
itself-occurs in and through ongoing collaborations in which states and
non-state actors work side-by-side as co-participants, co-authors, and coexecutors of policy, roughly as formal equals although certainly often of
unequal capacity and resources.

27.
28.
29.

Karkkainen et al., supra note 23.
Id.
Dorf& Sabel, supranote 11; Sabel etal.,supranote 11.
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These sorts of governance arrangements, furthermore, should not be
understood merely as external horizontal or vertical constraints on state
sovereignty. Instead, they involve a partial disaggregation or "unbundling"
of the package of powers that traditionally have been thought to constitute
Specifically, the state's power as sovereign to regulate
state sovereignty.
for protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources
within its territorial jurisdiction is detached and reassigned to a new
hybrid institutional form. There it is recombined and merged with the
powers, resources, expertise, and competencies of a variety of other state
and non-state actors, creating a wholly new governance structure-the
only structure capable of acting at the appropriate eco-geographical scale
and with an adequate scope of authority to meet the demands of
integrated ecosystem management. Characteristically, however, these new
arrangements are themselves open, polycentric, and continuously evolving. 31
Key elements of this model can be seen, inter alia, in the governance
arrangements for the Great Lakes and some other international freshwater
systems, the Baltic and some other regional seas, and, in certain crucial
respects, the global ozone depletion regime.
These new arrangements are not confined to the international arena.
Strikingly similar multi-party collaborative governance arrangements are
also emerging within nation-states to address similar categories of
complex environmental problems occurring wholly within the state's
conventional territorial jurisdiction, arguably leading to a partial
disaggregation (or at minimum, a significant redefinition) of state
sovereignty even within its own territorial borders. This paper draws on
an advanced example from the U.S. experience, the Chesapeake Bay
Program, which closely resembles in form and function the kinds of
arrangements now also emerging at the international level and which has
served as a leading prototype for some of the most important innovations
occurring elsewhere.

30. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 1997 183; S. SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE & MONEY (1998).
31.

Henry A. Regier, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Assessments: Case

Study, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENTS: SCIENCE AT THE CROSSROADS OF MANAGEMENT

ANDPOLICY 135, 138-39 (1999).

V. LEADING CASES

A. The Chesapeake Bay
By most accounts, the Chesapeake Bay program is the most extensive,
mature, institutionally complex, and successful of the new ecosystem
governance arrangements. It is widely viewed as a model for other large
Although the
estuaries and highly stressed marine ecosystems.3 2
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries are located entirely within the internal
waters of the United States, the Chesapeake Bay program nonetheless
represents a clear example of the institutional architecture I am calling
"post-sovereign."
As North America's largest estuary, the Chesapeake Bay was long
prized for its scenic beauty, recreational opportunities, and prolific fish
and shellfish production, but it suffered severe declines in environmental
conditions and living resources in the late 20th Century, despite the
emergence of stringent pollution control laws. In response, federal, state,
and local governments, together with local businesses, residents, and
NGOs, joined forces to create the Chesapeake Bay program, an ambitious
regional collaborative ecosystem management system seeking integrated
management of a suite of resources and environmental stressors in the
Bay itself and in the watersheds of its tributary streams.
Although the Clean Water Act (CWA) stringently regulates large
point-source polluters, it does not effectively reach pollution from
diffuse, non-point sources such as farms and city streets, nor does it
mandate integrated management of the aquatic ecosystem. Overall water
quality, therefore, remained poor even after the CWA's enactment, and
the adverse effects of pollution were aggravated by destruction or degradation
of coastal wetlands, riparian forest buffers, submerged benthic habitats,
and filter-feeding organisms that play critical roles in regulating water
quality and ecosystem health. Over-harvesting depleted crucial resources
like filter-feeding oysters that, when abundant, play a crucial role in
maintaining water quality. It became clear at an early stage that fixed
and uniform national pollution control rules would not be adequate to
address this complex of interrelated problems.3 3 The Chesapeake Bay
program's chief accomplishment is the development of a continuously
evolving set of institutional arrangements that allow it to address these
interrelated problems in response to rapidly changing understandings of
32. Robert Costanza & Jack Greer, The Chesapeake Bay and its Watershed: A
Model for Sustainable Ecosystem Management?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE
RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
[hereinafter BARRIERS AND BRIDGES].

33.

Id.

(Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995)
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the nature of the threat and to implement appropriate policy responses.34
Spurred by a broad citizen movement rallying under the motto "Save
the Bay!," Congress funded a major research program in the 1970s to
assess the Bay's status and the causes of its decline. That report revealed a
complex web of interrelated causes and alarming symptoms that spanned
several states in the region. 35 Responding to these findings, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the states of Maryland, Virginia,
and Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia, signed the Chesapeake
Bay Agreement in 1983, committing themselves to joint efforts to
improve and protect water quality and living resources of the Chesapeake
Bay's estuarine systems. The Agreement established a core institutional
framework, articulated a shared long-term vision, and set in motion an
iterative process of ongoing scientific investigation, evaluation, and revised
substantive commitments.
A second Chesapeake Bay Agreement in 1987 marked the next phase
in this evolutionary process. It established monitoring of biological indicators
of ecosystem health as the bedrock of future management efforts and
identified the productivity, diversity, and abundance of the Bay's living
resources as the best ultimate measures of the Chesapeake Bay's condition.
The 1987 Agreement set ambitious performance improvement targets,
including a goal of reducing nutrient loadings by forty percent. When
subsequent studies revealed that nutrient loadings in various tributaries
had differential impacts on water quality, the parties again revised
system-wide goals and codified them in a 1992 commitment to develop
tributary-specific nutrient reduction targets and implementation plans.
The increasingly localized nature of these tasks led the Chesapeake Bay
program to devolve crucial management responsibilities to semi-autonomous,
public/private tributary teams composed of government officials, scientific
experts, agricultural and industry representatives, and citizen volunteers
who became experts on problems and location-specific solutions in their
own tributaries, but whose local efforts remain nested within the larger
basin-wide institutional framework and policy goals.
Subsequent directives added progressively more detailed commitments in
such areas as toxic reduction, habitat restoration, riparian forest buffers,
wetlands protection, agricultural non-point source pollution reduction,
and removal of stream barriers to improve fish passage. The most recent

34.
35.

Sabel et al., supra note 11.
Costanza & Greer, supra note 32.

basinwide agreement, known simply as Chesapeake 2000, is the most
detailed and comprehensive recovery plan to date. It set ambitious targets
for the restoration of oyster beds, wetlands, riparian buffers, and submerged
aquatic vegetation; called for the development of multi-species management
plans to protect sensitive biological communities; and committed to
develop and implement stream-specific watershed management plans and
stream corridor restoration goals. It also addressed land use goals, calling
for a thirty percent reduction in the rate of urban sprawl and permanent
preservation of twenty percent of the lands in the watershed.
Complex institutional arrangements have co-evolved alongside these
increasingly comprehensive programmatic commitments. At the center
of these arrangements is an Executive Council, consisting of signatories
to the framework agreement, responsible for setting overall goals and
objectives. At the next tier is a permanent Implementation Committee,
comprising of representatives from 27 federal and regional agencies,
which develops and carries out more fully elaborated ecosystem restoration
plans. The Executive Council and Implementation Committee carry out their
work in consultation with a Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee, a
permanent Citizens Advisory Committee, and a Local Government
Advisory Committee. Details of the Implementation Committee's work
are delegated to subcommittees on monitoring, modeling, research, and
habitat restoration, as well as tributary-specific teams. Coordinating all
these efforts is an EPA liaison office. These polyarchic arrangements
ensure that a variety of governmental and non-governmental voices have
opportunities to help shape overall program direction and contribute
their own expertise and competencies to a joint collaborative enterprise
that is collectively better-informed and more capable than any of its
constituent parts.
Participants in the Chesapeake Bay program have come to
recognize that the more they learn about the Bay's complex ecology,
the more surprises they will encounter. The Chesapeake Bay program
not only expects surprises, but aggressively seeks them out. Much of
the Chesapeake Bay program's overall effort goes into ecosystemsituated scientific investigation; monitoring of critical stressors and
biological indicators; computerized modeling of the Bay's complex
mosaic of ecosystem processes; and Geographic Information System
mapping to facilitate synthesis, analysis, and presentation of data on
basin-wide or location-specific scales-which all feed back into
continuous reevaluations of policy. The one constant is that the
Chesapeake Bay program's goals, objectives, and policy measures are
invariably viewed as provisional, subject to iterative refinement or
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large-scale modification as needed in a pragmatic mutual adjustment
of means and ends.3 6
To carry out these efforts, the Chesapeake Bay program employs a
grab bag of regulatory techniques, legal instruments, and voluntary
measures. These sometimes take the form of legislation or administrative
rules at the federal, state, or municipal levels, binding throughout the
region or in some of its parts. Sometimes they consist of largely
procedural framework agreements within which subsequent objectives
and implementation measures may be progressively iterated. At other
points, they take the form of non-binding voluntary guidelines, technical
or financial assistance to private parties, or pleas for voluntary cooperation
coupled with social pressure on non-cooperators.3 7 The Chesapeake
Executive Council often advances proposed measures through joint
executive decrees called "directives." Though of dubious legal status, these
are viewed, at a minimum, as morally binding commitments on the part
of each executive to use all available powers and authorities to carry out
the stated aims. Throughout the process, the familiar boundaries between
"law" and "not-law," "public" and "private," and "sovereign" and "subject"
grow indistinct. What matters is what works, and that varies with the
circumstance. 38
The Chesapeake Bay example suggests that the trend toward partial
disaggregation, recombination, and redefinition of the core attributes of
state sovereignty is not confined to the international arena. Instead, a
distinctive problem-solving, polyarchic governance model is emerging
in response to complex ecological problems that overwhelm the
capacities of the sovereign state, whether problems of that character
occur within the state's territorial boundaries or partially beyond them.
Developments in the Chesapeake Bay region should also be understood
as roughly analogous in value in the international arena to the theory of
dual sovereignty that informs U.S. federalism. Under international law,
the U.S. government is presumed sovereign over persons and natural
resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As a matter of U.S. law,
however, the (subnational) state governments are also considered quasisovereign entities, and the federal government is a government of
limited, enumerated powers. Some matters fall within the exclusive
competence of the states, not merely at the sufferance of the federal
36.
37.
38.

Sabel et al., supra note 11.
Costanza & Greer, supra note 32.
Sabel et al., supra note 11.

government, but as a matter of fundamental legal right. In other matters,
responsibilities are broadly shared. In a few areas, including foreign
affairs and the regulation of commerce among the several states, the
federal role is exclusive.
Given the limited dual sovereign role of the states, the law of interstate relations in the U.S. is sometimes seen as having precedential value
in international law, just as international law has been taken, by analogy,
as the source of principles to adjudicate disputes among U.S. states. The
argument advanced here, then, is that the new hybrid governance
arrangements in the Chesapeake Bay reflect a model of collaboration
readily adaptable to the international arena. In this model, multiple
sovereigns-here, the federal government and the several states-effectively
cede and recombine crucial elements of their sovereign powers, joining
forces in a new problem-solving hybrid institutional arrangement that
also embraces non-state actors. That arrangement, as the Chesapeake
Bay program's partners have discovered, is better suited to the complexities
of ecosystem management than traditional exercises of sovereign
prerogative.
B. The U.S.-Canadian Great Lakes
The joint U.S.-Canadian effort to manage the Great Lakes ecosystem
extends the Chesapeake Bay model to a transnational resource. Forming
a large portion of the U.S.-Canadian border in the heavily industrialized
heartlands of both nations, the Great Lakes comprise about twenty
percent of the fresh surface water on the planet. Like the Chesapeake
Bay program, Great Lakes management efforts emerged from recognition
that, despite significant progress under conventional rule-based regulation in
reducing gross pollutant inputs from industrial point sources and
municipal wastewater systems, the ecosystems of the lakes remained
badly degraded by a complex of interrelated problems. These included
excess nutrients, airborne toxic pollutants, contaminated sediments in
rivers and harbors, declining fisheries, wetlands loss, and alteration of
natural stream flows from approximately 6,000 tributaries across the
300,000 square mile basin, requiring a reorientation toward integrated
management. 39 The management approach that has emerged to govern
39. W.J. Christie, The Ecosystem Approach to Managing the Great Lakes: The
New Ideas and Problems Associated with Implementing Them, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 279
(1995); George R. Francis & Henry A. Regier, Barriers and Bridges to the
Restoration of the GreatLakes Basin Ecosystem, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note
32, at 239-41; Henry A. Regier, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Assessments:
Case Study, in BIOREGIONAL ASSESSMENTS:
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (1999).
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the Great Lakes is arguably the premier example of successful transboundary
collaboration in joint management of a freshwater aquatic ecosystem.4 °
The United States and Canada negotiated the first Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement in 1972, based on conventional pollution control
approaches then emerging in the laws of both nations. Recognizing that
conventional pollution control strategies would not be sufficient to
restore ecosystem health in the Great Lakes, subsequent 1978 and 1987
revisions of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement explicitly embraced
the goal of integrated ecosystem management throughout the Great
Lakes basin.4 1 Significant progress has been made in that direction through
a deeply collaborative transnational effort that extends well beyond
sovereign-to-sovereign relations to embrace subnational governments
and the organs of civil society on both sides of the border. Co-collaborators
include various federal agencies in both nations, eight U.S. states, two
Canadian provinces, major ports and municipalities throughout the
region, Native American tribes (U.S.) and First Nations (Canada), local
and regional NGOs, leading businesses and trade associations, and the
independent scientific community. 2
Also playing leading roles are a series of binational non-governmental
and intergovernmental bodies:
" Great Lakes United, an influential transnational federation of NGOs;
" the International Association of Great Lakes Research, a
transnational scientific society;
" the Council of Great Lakes Governors, a coordinating body for
the chief executive officers of the U.S. states;
" the Great Lakes Commission, a coordinating body for U.S.
states and Canadian provinces;
" the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Mayors Conference, a transnational
coordinating body for municipal officials;
" the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission, charged with
coordinating management of fishery resources; and

Cf. PATRICIA BOYLE & ALAN BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
40.
ENVIRONMENT 327-27 (2d ed. 2002) (describing Great Lakes management efforts as an
exemplary model of successful transboundary ecosystem management); DAVID HUNTER
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 809 (2d ed. 2002) (stating
that the Great Lakes management effort is "[o]ne of the most widely respected
transboundary freshwater management initiatives").
41. Francis & Regier, supra note 39.
42. Id.; Regier, supra note 31, at 141-42.

the International Joint Commission, a six-member binational
commission established under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
to regulate lake levels and water diversions and to adjudicate
international disputes concerning Great Lakes' resources.43
Although the latter has no direct management authority over environmental
quality issues, it is recognized as an influential voice in the ongoing
policy discussion. The International Joint Commission provides overall
coordination, organizes high-visibility fora for public participation, produces
independent critical evaluations of management programs and progress
toward agreed goals and objectives, and sponsors subsidiary scientific,
technical, and advisory bodies that are often highly influential in their
own right.44
Like the Chesapeake Bay program, the Great Lakes initiative incorporates
a "nested structure, devising strategies and coordinating management
efforts at multiple scales, from local harbors and tributary watersheds to
the basin as a whole." 5 Basin-wide efforts include the Binational Toxics
Strategy, a voluntary effort developed through a broadly collaborative
and participatory process that included industry groups as well as NGOs
and governmental entities, and a Biennial State of the Lakes Ecosystem
Conference, which invites collaborative partners to participate in
periodic joint reassessment of progress, goals, plans, and implementation
measures. At an intermediate scale are Lakewide Area Management
Plans (LAMPS) for each of the five lakes (four of which straddle the
international boundary), developed through lake-specific binational
collaborations among federal, state or provincial, and local governmental
agencies, as well as non-state parties. At the most localized scales,
Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) have been developed for each of 43
designated priority "Areas of Concern," typically contaminated ports
and estuaries contributing high levels of pollution loadings. RAPs are
highly variable in their structures, processes, and policy approaches, but
in most cases they are characterized by high levels of local public
participation and multi-party collaboration among state and non-state
actors. 6 Overseeing implementation is a Binational Executive Committee

43. Francis & Regier, supra note 39; at 274-75 Christie, supra note 39, at 141-42,
47-48; Regier, supra note 31; Susan M. McKenzie, Toward Integrated Resource
Management: Lessons About the Ecosystem Approachfrom the Laurentian Great Lakes,
21 ENVTL. MGMT. 173 (1997).
44. Regier, supra note 31, at 141.
45. Regier, supra note 31, at 138; U.S. EPA Great Lakes National Program Office,
Great Lakes Ecosystem Report, EPA-905-R-01-001 (2000), available at http://www.
epa.gov/grt/lakes/rptcong2001.
46. McKenzie, supra note 43; Regier, supra note 31, at 138-40.
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comprising U.S., Canadian, state, provincial, and tribal officials.47 An
EPA coordinating office, the Great Lakes National Program Office, was
created in 1987, emulating the successful model of the Chesapeake
Bay, with Environment Canada, the federal environmental protection
agency, playing a cognate role on the Canadian side.48 Significantly,
however, while these federal agencies serve as central repositories of
expertise and hubs of policy coordination, they do not claim exclusive
competence or hierarchical authority over decision-making and problemsolving in the region. Tying together this sprawling polyarchic governance
structure is a common core of information, data, and communication
links provided by the Great Lakes Information Network, itself a
binational public/private collaboration that pools the databases and
information resources of dozens of governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities throughout the region.49
The Great Lakes management effort thus rests on deep, ongoing,
transboundary collaboration among state and non-state parties jointly
committed to the co-management of a shared resource of critical
importance to a region that extends across the territorial boundary. The
institutional arrangements that jointly comprise the management regime
extend well beyond the organs of the respective sovereign states to
include a variety of sub-national and non-state actors, interacting
through informal and sometimes even nominally extra-constitutional
channels to effect governance in the void left by state incapacity. 50 As
in the Chesapeake Bay, these efforts have a rolling, experimentalist
flavor, as the parties continuously reassess and revise goals, objectives,
and management measures in light of lessons learned, newly emerging
science, and changing social, political, economic, and environmental
conditions within the complex eco-region of the Great Lakes.
C. The Baltic Sea
The institutions that have emerged for collaborative management of
the Baltic Sea are increasingly recognized as a model for other regional
marine management efforts, including those sponsored by the United

47. U.S. EPA, supra note 15.
48. Id.
49. George Francis & Sally Lerner, NGOs and Great Lakes Biodiversity
Conservation,in SAVING THE SEAS, (L. Anathea Brooks & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 1997).
50. Regier, supra note 31, at 139.

Nations Environment Programme's Regional Seas program. 5' The
Baltic regime shares many important characteristics of the Chesapeake
and Great Lakes efforts. The three programs are well aware of these
similarities and endeavor to learn from each other through consultations
and scientific and technical exchanges.5 2 This constitutes a kind of
horizontal networking and benchmarking of the best environmental
management practices, in this case not at the state-to-state level but
rather at the level of regional collaborative governance arrangements.
The Baltic Sea is the world's largest body of brackish water,
functioning much like a large estuary with fresh water from its numerous
tributary rivers mixing with a highly variable saline water inflow
through the narrow straits separating the Baltic from the North Sea. 53 Its
watershed encompasses some of the most intensive industrial, agricultural,
and silvicultural production in Northern and Eastern Europe, resulting in
54
severe toxic and conventional pollution, siltation, and eutrophication.
Complicating management efforts, the Baltic coast spans nine states with
widely divergent environmental standards, economic conditions,
political systems, and approaches to environmental protection.
The more environmentally minded of the Baltic coastal states recognized
early on that protection of their marine waters would require transboundary
cooperation within the region.55 Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that concern for the Baltic was a prime factor motivating
Sweden to host the historic 1972 United Nations Stockholm Conference
on the Environment, widely credited with ushering in the era of modern
international environmental law. 56 By 1974, the seven then-extant Baltic
51. UNEP, Needs and Approaches to Improve Access to Environmental
Information for Transboundary Decision-Making in the Baltic Sea Region,
UNEP/DEIA/MR, 1997.
52. Id.; U.S. EPA, The Great Lakes/Baltic Sea Partnership Program Framework
Plan, availableat http://www.epa.gov/grtlakes/baltic/plan.html.
53. Bengt-Owe Jansson & Harald Velner, The Baltic: The Sea of Surprises, in
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 32, at 298.
54.

Id.; Rafal Serafin, & Jerzy Zaleski, Baltic Europe: Environmental Management in

Context, in SAVING THE SEAS: VALUES, SCIENTISTS, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

(L. Anathea Brooks & Stacey D. VanDeveer eds., 1997).
55.

ROBERT G. DARST, SMOKESTACK DIPLOMACY: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN

EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 55-57 (2001) (stating that scientific consensus
concerning the severity of the Baltic's environmental problems emerged in the late
1960s, and by the early 1970s, Western states had concluded that regional cooperation
would be required to address them); Peter M. Haas, Protecting the Baltic and North
Seas, in
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
56.

Robert W. Knecht, Institutional Implications of Sustainable Development at

the Regional Scale, in REGIONAL SEAS: TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,

(S.

Belfiore et al. eds., 1996); See also Janson & Velner, supra note 53, at 303, 365-66
(describing the growing concern for environmental protection in Sweden in the 1950s
and 1960s and the emergence of regional commitments to strengthen Baltic
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states signed a framework Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment in the Baltic Sea Area (Convention), which entered into
force in 1980. 57 The Convention-the first multi-state regional agreement
aimed at controlling and reducing pollution from land-based and airborne
sources as well as ships 58-created a permanent institutional apparatus
centering on the Baltic Marine Environmental Commission, more
commonly known as the Helsinki Commission or HELCOM. HELCOM
was granted broad authority to collect, assess, and disseminate information
on environmental conditions and on the implementation of the parties'
commitments to monitor conditions, exchange data, and report on
discharges, dumping, or spills occurring under their jurisdiction.
HELCOM and its subsidiary working groups proceeded to produce a
remarkable stream of detailed, quasi-legislative decisions and nonbinding recommendations to member states on various aspects of marine
environmental protection, including ship-based pollution, controls on
toxic pollutants, and "best management practices" for agriculture and
other land-based sources of marine pollution. 60 Although not legally
binding, these recommendations were adopted by unanimous consent of
the HELCOM parties and, like the Chesapeake Bay program's "directives,"
are regarded as morally, if not legally, binding. Like other "soft law"
commitments, HELCOM recommendations have been judged to be quite
influential in shaping parties' behavior. 61 Because of their relative
informality, they have also proven to be generally easier to adopt, amend,
and revise in light of new learning than formal treaty commitments.62
In other respects as well, the dynamic thrust of the Baltic regime
comes from initiatives that lie outside formal international legal
commitments. In 1988, Sweden convened a meeting of the environmental

environmental protection at the 1972 Stockholm conference).
57. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, done at Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974.
58. DARST, supra note 55, at 57.
59. Owen Greene, Implementation Review and the Baltic Sea Regime, in THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 178-79 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS].
60. Id.; DARST, supra note 55, at 64-65.

61. Alexei Roginko, Domestic Implementation of Baltic Sea Pollution Commitments in
Russia and the Baltic States, in IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 59,
at 575, 581.
62. Id.; see also ABRAHAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).

ministers of the Baltic states, who agreed to a (then) non-binding goal of
fifty percent reductions in discharges of nutrients, heavy metals, and
organic toxins by 1995 63-a "soft law" commitment later formally
incorporated into the revised 1992 treaty. 64 That same year, HELCOM
granted observer status to NGOs, allowing them access to HELCOM
documents and entitling them to participate in working group meetings
on a non-voting basis. The inclusion of non-state voices and perspectives
into the regional governance process lent transparency to its accomplishments
and failures, created new channels through which substantive information
might be conveyed to the regional public, and contributed to the growth
of region-wide popular constituencies for environmental improvements.6 5
Active non-governmental participants include national, regional, and
global environmental NGOs, regional associations of ports and
municipalities, industry groups, and independent scientific societies like
the Baltic Marine Biologists, the Conference of Baltic Oceanographers,
and the Conference of Baltic Hydrologists. NGO representatives frequently
serve on governmental boards in the various member states and participate
in region-wide management institutions.6 6 IGOs and NGOs have also
undertaken significant implementation responsibilities, especially in
providing financial and technical assistance to remediation projects and
monitoring their implementation.
In 1990, the heads of government of the Baltic states, together with
Norway, Czechoslovakia, and the European Commission (EC), issued
the Baltic Sea Declaration on Environment, calling for a reorientation of
environmental measures from conventional "end-of-pipe" pollution
control strategies toward ecological restoration of the Baltic marine
environment. This new ecosystem orientation was to be coupled with an
emphasis on reducing pollution at the source through "cleaner technologies,
including low-waste and non-waste processes and environmentally non63. See DARST, supra note 55, at 64. A recent summary report prepared by the
Finnish Environment Institute concluded that most Baltic states had met the 50%
reduction goal for phosphorus loadings from point sources, while achieving smaller
reductions for nitrogen loadings from point sources and mixed results for non-point
sources. The Finnish Environment Institute, Evaluation of the Implementation of the
1988 Ministerial Declaration Regarding Nutrient Load Reductions in the Baltic Sea
CatchmentArea 62, THE FINNISH ENVIRONMENT 524 (2002).
64. Compare Declaration on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
Baltic Sea Area, adopted on 15 February 1988 in Helsinki by the Ministers Responsible
for Environmental Protection in the Baltic Sea States (declaring "firm determination" to
reduce nutrients by 50%), with Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area, 1992, Art. 5 (undertaking binding commitment to prevent and
eliminate pollution from all sources); id. at Art. 6 (undertaking binding commitment to
achieve pollution reduction by using Best Environmental Practices for all sources and
Best Available Technology for point sources).
65. UNEP,supranote 51,at 14-22.
66. Jansson & Velner, supra note 53, at 307, 334.
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hazardous products." The Ministers also created a Baltic Task Force
(later the Program Implementation Task Force) consisting of HELCOM
members, Czechoslovakia, Norway, the EC, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the
Nordic Investment Bank, and the World Bank. The function of the Task
Force was to identify and develop cost-effective investment projects
throughout the region that will reduce pollution, focusing especially on
pollution "hot spots" in the financially strapped states of the former
Soviet bloc. 6 7 This innovative regional cross-subsidy approach emerged
when the Nordic countries, which had already substantially reduced
pollution, recognized that further domestic pollution control measures
would be costly and that more cost-effective opportunities for pollution
reduction lay in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.68 Adapting a
strategy pioneered in the Great Lakes, regional institutions have
identified some 132 pollution "hot spots," most (but not all) of them in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Remediation of these "hot
spots" is carried out with technical assistance from program partners and
financial assistance provided by a consortia of development banks and
These efforts thus link regional and
bilateral assistance programs.
local scales, subtly bypassing the conventional claim of sovereign states
to exclusive competence to manage environmental problems within their
territorial boundaries.
Simultaneously, the Baltic process has launched a region-wide program
to designate "green spots," an interlinked network of protected areas. At
intermediate regional scales, effective transboundary collaborations have
been established between Finland, Russia, and Estonia, with respect to
67. Roginko, supranote 61; Jansson & Velner, supra note 53, at 344.
68. Roginko, supra note 61; DARST, supra note 55, at 70-71 (stating that because
environmental standards in Western states were already high, "each effort to wring
additional [pollution] reductions from domestic sources brought progressively
diminishing marginal returns," making Western states "increasingly self-interested in
bringing about reduced discharges in Eastern states" where the same environmental
gains could be purchased at lower cost). In some cases marginal pollution control efforts
in the Nordic states may be ten times more costly than in the East. See, e.g., Mikko
Kiirikki et al., 3D Ecosystem Models as Decision Support Tools in the Gulf of
Finland-The Kotka Archipelago as an Example, in BALTIC COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS:
STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT [hereinafter BALTIC COASTAL

ECOSYSTEMS] 293, 307 (Gerald Schernewski & Ulrich Schiewer eds., 2002) (stating that

nutrient load reduction efforts in the St. Petersburg region of Russia are more than ten
times more cost-effective than marginal pollution control costs in Finnish waters, though
the latter must also be carried out because they affect nearshore waters).

69.

Serafin & Zalesi, supra note 54, at 345; Greene, supra note 59.

the Gulf of Finland,7 ° and between Sweden and Finland, with respect to
the Gulf of Bothnia. 71 The program thus reflects a multi-tiered "nested"
management architecture closely resembling those found in the
Chesapeake and Great Lakes regions.
In 1992, all nine Baltic states and the European Community codified
72
these various commitments in a new Helsinki Convention, calling for
the restoration of the Baltic Sea ecosystem through concerted action
throughout the watershed, extending to territorial seas, internal waters,
and inshore land-based sources, 73 through efforts consistent with a Joint
Comprehensive Environmental Action Program to be periodically revised
and updated in collaboration with the development banks already
participating in the task force.74 The experimentalist flavor of the new
convention is reflected in its charge to the Program Implementation Task
Force to "prepare and undertake a practical rolling work [program], with
measurable goals and targets" and to "periodically review and propose
updating of the [program], taking into account technological and economic
developments
75 as well as changes in the environmental status of the
Baltic Sea.",
More recently, under the rubric of "Visions and Strategies around the
Baltic Sea Region," a parallel ministerial process has emerged to
coordinate land use planning and sustainable economic development
consistent with HELCOM's broad ecological
efforts in the region,
76
restoration goals.
Like the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes programs, the Baltic
regime views joint monitoring of environmental conditions and stressors
as an essential foundation for policy development, periodic reassessment,
and adaptive adjustment. Reporting requirements, monitoring protocols,
70. See DARST, supra note 55, at 80-83 (detailing Finnish-Estonian cooperation);
Jansson & Velner, supra note 53, at 344.
71. Jansson & Velner, supra note 53, at 403.
72. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, 1992, done at Helsinki, Apr. 9, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 7, 2000).
73. See id., Art. 4 (obligating each party to implement the convention within its
territorial sea and internal waters) & Art. 6 (extending obligation to prevent and
eliminate land-based marine pollution to all point and non-point sources within the entire
catchment area of the Baltic). See also DARST, supra note 55, at 73-74 (stating that the
1992 Convention brought the internal waters of contracting parties within its jurisdiction
and obligated parties to take specific measures to combat land-based pollution).
74. They are the Council of Europe Development Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Nordic Investment
Bank, the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, and the World Bank.
75. Terms of Reference for the Programme Implementation Task Force, HELCOM
PITF 16/2000, Annex 4.
76. See Andreas Kannen, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in the
Context of Spatial Planning,in BALTIC COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 68, at 193,
200-01.
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and assessment capacity have been periodically revised and strengthened,
building regional capacity to generate and adjust to new information on
ecological conditions." Monitoring of physical, chemical, and biological
variables of the open sea started in 1979, but until 1992, monitoring of
coastal waters was considered a national responsibility and only summary
assessments were required to be reported. Under the revised 1992
Convention, however, states are obligated to monitor coastal waters and
report directly to the Commission. The 1992 Convention also calls for
monitoring in designated Baltic Sea Protected Areas. In 1992, the
Environment Committee decided to integrate these disparate monitoring
programs into a common structure, designated "Cooperative Monitoring
in the Baltic Marine Environment," which now coordinates monitoring
region-wide under uniform monitoring protocols and data standards.
Initiatives have also been undertaken to improve transparency,
communication, access to information, and effective decision-making on
a regional scale through web-based information systems like
BALLERINA, which pools the data and information resources of a
variety of state and non-state actors like the model established by the
Great Lakes Information Network.78
By most accounts, the Baltic regime has been reasonably effective in
addressing land-based pollution and significant progress is indicated in
many other areas. 79 Although nitrate levels and overall eutrophication
80
have not improved, phosphorus concentrations have decreased significantly8
and nitrogen loadings from point sources have declined sharply. '
Concentrations of organochlorine compounds have decreased throughout
the region, bringing corresponding improvements to populations of
marine mammals and sea birds, 82 and twenty-six priority pesticides have

77. Greene, supra note 59, at 192-95.
78. UNEP, supra note 51, at 15; see also Irene Lucius, Developing Efficient
Information Provision Tools for ICM Practitionersin the Baltic, in BALTIC COASTAL
ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 68, at 321, 324-26 (detailing a series of web-based information
and decision support tools now under development in the region, which integrate and
disseminate information on eutrophication and other key environmental quality
indicators, as well as meteorological, oceanographic, hydrological, biological, and land
cover data).
79. See generally Haas, supra note 55, at 170-77; UNEP, supra note 51.
80. Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area 1994-1998, Baltic Sea Environment Proceedings No. 82A (2001), at 5.
81. Finnish Environment Institute, supra note 63, at 4.
82. Id. at 10-11, 15.

been eliminated completely. 83 Indeed, HELCOM has been criticized in
some quarters for placing too heavy an emphasis on environmental
protection at the expense of competing economic needs and uses of the
Baltic Sea.84
More than any other international marine management effort, the
Baltic regime exhibits the collaborative, experimentalist, and polyarchic
flavor that I have characterized here as post-sovereign governance. It
operates at regional transboundary scales, extending its reach even to
joint analysis and management of environmental problems within the
territorial seas, internal waters, and land-based activities deep within the
interior reaches of participating states to the extent they affect the quality
of the marine environment, thus piercing the myth of exclusive sovereign
competency to control activities within a state's territorial jurisdiction.85 It
adopts an ecosystem-oriented, holistic, integrated approach to environmental
management, and as a necessary corollary, it is self-consciously
experimentalist and adaptive, operating through the progressive and
iterative articulation, reassessment, and readjustment of goals and policy
responses as scientific understanding deepens and monitoring data
produce new information.86 Like the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes
programs with which it has established fraternal relations, the Baltic Sea
program increasingly involves deep transnational collaboration, not only
among sovereign states and their subsidiary organs, but also among
subnational governments, industry groups, environmental and other
NGOs, scientific societies, IGOs, and other non-state parties throughout
the Baltic basin in a joint exercise in eco-regional environmental
governance.
VI. TOWARD A GLOBAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR
"POST-SOVEREIGN" ARRANGEMENTS

These cases place several large eco-regions, jointly encompassing a
non-trivial share of the planet's vital environmental resources, under
collaborative and experimentalist governance arrangements of the type
that I have described as "post-sovereign" governance. Each of the cases
cited here has been widely hailed in policy circles as an innovative and
83. Getting Rid of HazardousSubstances by 2020, HELCOM NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 4.
84. See, e.g., F. Rijsberman, The Effectiveness of the Helsinki Convention as a Tool
for Integrated Coastal Resources Management of the Baltic Sea, in OECD Documents,
Coastal Zone Management285, 297-98 (OECD Environment Directorate, 1990).
85. See DARST, supra note 55, at 74 (stating that both planning and implementation of
the JCP are considered joint activities, carried out by PITF members and independent
consultants).
86. See Jansson & Velner, supra note 53.
87. Id.
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successful model, to be studied and emulated by those seeking to
manage other marine (Baltic), estuarine (Chesapeake Bay), or freshwater
aquatic (Great Lakes) resources. This suggests that the influence of this
model might eventually extend well beyond these regions. Thus far, all
the cases have a distinctly regional character.
What does this model tell us about global decision-making and global
environmental governance? Given the apparent successes of each of the
regimes examined here, global policy-makers might consider whether
some seemingly global environmental problems might better lend
themselves to regional solutions, on the theory that effective intersovereign and state/non-state problem-solving collaborations of the
kinds described here might be more readily obtained at eco-regional
scales. For example, the conservation of biodiversity might better be
understood not as a single overarching global problem requiring uniform
global rules and approaches, but rather as a series of thematically linked
local and regional ecosystem-scale problems, ultimately requiring local
and regional solutions and replicable regional governance models. Thus,
for example, we might fruitfully divide the problem of biodiversity
conservation into such thematic categories as protection of tropical
rainforests, temperate rainforests, boreal forests, mangrove forests, large
estuaries, large marine ecosystems, and so forth, and then look to
experiment with, evaluate, and replicate collaborative regional governance
models within each of those thematic categories. Indeed, it appears that
the Biodiversity Convention and its subsidiary bodies and affiliated
NGOs and IGOs are already beginning to make some conceptual
progress in that direction, although on-the-ground implementation lags.
This, in turn, begins to suggest a revised role for global agreements and
global institutions-to spawn and support regional governance processes
that place the effective locus of governance at the appropriate ecoregional scale, while nesting such regional efforts within some larger set
of global institutions that can monitor the various regional governance
mechanisms, provide technical assistance, identify and diffuse best
practices, and so forth. The role of global agreements and institutions
thus would shift from one of imposing fixed rules and standard
approaches to one of supporting adaptive ecosystem management at
ecologically appropriate scales.
Similarly, many problems of the marine environment, and virtually all
problems involving freshwater aquatic systems, can be understood as
primarily local or regional in character. Rather than awaiting the

emergence of global rules concerning land-based marine pollution, for
example, we might begin to address these problems at eco-regional
levels and then seek to bootstrap success in some path-breaking regions
(such as the Chesapeake Bay or the Baltic Sea) into a coordinated global
network of regional efforts, one that revolves around a central capacity
to monitor regional projects and to benchmark, evaluate, and diffuse best
practices and new learning. Regional approaches also increasingly inform
fisheries management, especially under the new Straddling Stocks
Convention, and opportunities might emerge for horizontal benchmarking
and diffusion of successful strategies and approaches in that context as
well. In general, however, such regional efforts thus far have taken a
backseat on the international environmental policy agenda to high-profile
global issues and rule-based approaches, where progress generally has
been more difficult to achieve.
In the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and Baltic Sea programs, sovereign
states are neither the sole authors nor merely the implementers of the
rules; they are co-authors in an ongoing multi-party governance process
that at least partially reflects the characteristics of "post-sovereign"
governance.

